Pan-Arabist Origins of Libya’s Chad War

 

Brother Muammar

Libya, in its post-independence interventions in Chad, which have been dubbed “Africa’s Thirty Years’ War”, vied for possession of northern Chad’s Aouzou Strip with its uranium and other mineral wealth and also sought to create a regional sphere of influence and a buffer zone so as to remove potentially hostile Zionist and imperialist influence from its doorstep. Not only economic or military in character, however, the intervention was also informed by a pan-Arabist ideology. “As was the case with Nasser, Qadhdhafi’s foreign policy is marked by a series of futile efforts to unify the Arab world,” Israeli scholar Benyamin Neuberger would comment a decade into the conflict:

During his first three years in power (1969-1972) Qadhdhafi’s pan-Arab zeal was directed to the Arab East (Mashriq). In February 1970, a Federal Union between Libya, Egypt and the Sudan was established. In April 1971, the Confederation of Arab Republics consisting of Libya, Egypt and Syria, was founded. In August 1972, Qadhdhafi and Sadat called for a merger between Egypt and Libya. All those efforts ended in failure. A turning point with regard to “unification” with Egypt was the fiasco of the people’s march into Egypt in July 1973, a march through which Qadhdhafi and the Libyan “masses” sought to force a merger against Egypt’s inclination […] The final break with Egypt came in the aftermath of the October 1973 war, when Egypt reached a series of agreements with Israel.

Libya, disillusioned with the Mashriq turned to the Arab West (Maghrib). In January 1974, what proved to be a shortlived union with Tunisia was announced. Offers to Algeria followed later. But these efforts were also abortive. Faced with failures in the Mashriq and Maghrib, Qadhdhafi then turned southwards to the Arab and Arabised Sahara to realize his pan-Arab dreams. The “unification” with Chad, and the growing Libyan involvement in Mauritania and the Western Sahara were a direct result of Libya’s failures to merge with its neighbours to the east (Egypt and Sudan) and to the west (Tunisia and Algeria). Nevertheless, Libya did not relinquish Nasser’s vision of an Arab empire from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arab (Persian) Gulf. An indication of this was the “union” with Syria which was announced in September 1980. Qadhdhafi only changed the tactics, namely to accumulate power by creating a Libyan-led Saharan-Arab bloc which might then use its power resources to attract other states in the Mashriq and Maghrib to a greater pan-Arab state. Qadhdhafi’s African policies reflect not only Libyan state interests but also the vision of pan-Arabism. [1]

Chadian leader Francois Tombalbaye meets with Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol

“With regard to Chad, Libya emphasized its Arab character, and explained the Libyan involvement as an Arab brotherly act towards the Arab people of Chad,” Neuberger continues. “In Qadhdhafi’s eyes the arabised Saharan and Sahelian [black Muslim] parts of Chad are part and parcel of the ‘Great Arab Homeland’.” [2] Consequently, the Libyan leader would sponsor the Muslim nationalist rebel Abba Siddick’s FROLINAT (National Liberation Front of Chad) in its war against the southern and black, non-Muslim Chadian government favored by the French. “Pan-Arab solidarity further explains Qadhdhafi’s zeal in trying to remove the Israeli presence from the whole of Africa,” Neuberger writes. “In Chad, too, Qadhdhafi regarded the eradication of Israeli presence and influence as one of his major aims.” [3] He elaborates:

Chad’s cordial relations with Israel – dating back to the early days of independence – reinforced Qadhdhafi’s hostility toward [François] Tombalbaye’s regime. The Libyan demand to expel the Israelis from Chad was persistently raised by Qadhdhafi after his assumption of power in 1969. Libya officially accused Chad of harbouring Israeli bases, serving Israeli interests, and being subservient to “Zionist capital and influence which seeks to enslave Africa”. Tombalbaye was personally attacked as an ally and a puppet of Israel, who received orders from the Israeli ambassador. [4]

Libya achieved some success in diminishing Israeli influence in Chad. Other objectives in the country, however, would be consistently foiled. While southern power was shaken and Libyan-backed Muslim factions entered into new government coalitions, the convoluted developments of the late 1970s and early 1980s would see elements of Libya’s proxies shift allegiances in reaction to Libya’s growing ambitions and meddling and the invasion of the Libyan military in 1980. FROLINAT dissenter Hissène Habré, who eventually established himself as Chad’s dictator with US assistance, put an end to the pan-Arabist project of Libyan-Chadian unification, and with it arguably dealt a fatal blow to Libyan Nasserism.  

Rainer Chlodwig von K.

Rainer is the author of Drugs, Jungles, and Jingoism.

Endnotes

[1] Neuberger, Benyamin. Involvement, Invasion and Withdrawal: Qadhdhafi’s Libya and Chad, 1969-1981. Tel Aviv: Shiloah Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1982, pp. 61-62.

[2] Ibid., p. 62.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 25.